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INDIVIDUAL TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS AND
SIMPLICITY: LET ECONOMIC GROWTH FEND
FOR ITSELF*
MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal income tax system has undergone significant change since
1981. First, in a paean to supply-side economic theory the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981' slashed both maximum marginal tax rates and
the tax base. Subsequent tax acts in 19822 and 19841 broadened the base in
an effort to increase revenues without expressly increasing rates. Then the
much heralded Tax Reform Act of 19864 broadened the tax base sufficiently
to lower rates even further. Tax acts subsequent to 1986 again were designed
to increase revenues by broadening the base while holding rates at the then
current levels. 5 Despite the myriad changes in the tax laws during the 1980s
and the almost universal cry for stability from tax practitioners, the need
for further reform cannot be denied.
Although many of the base broadening provisions of the tax legislation
of the 1980s were well grounded in tax policy analysis, some of the most
significant provisions, such as the passive activity loss rules, are difficult to
understand from a theoretical tax policy perspective. They must be justified,
to the extent possible, as ad hoc solutions to problems in the tax system
that were not addressed directly or as facets of tax expenditure analysis. In
addition, many exclusions from the tax base that cannot be justified on tax
policy grounds survived the tax reform of the 1980s. Finally, the 1986 Act
etched into the statute the low effective tax rates for high income taxpayers
that previously had been achieved through tax planning and tax shelters
and did serious damage to the vertical equity of tax rates.
The 1992 election promises to sire still more tax reform. But preliminary
indications are that the Clinton Administration's view of tax reform for the
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this essay. Neither of them, however, necessarily subscribes to the views I express here.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
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2. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26

U.S.C.).
5. See generally C. EuOENE STmmju_,

THE TAx DECADE: How TAXES CAME TO

DOMINATE THE PuBuc AGENDA 166-84 (1992) [hereinafter TAX DEcADE].

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:459

' 6
1990s is narrow, and to some extent is tax "deform" rather than "reform.
Some of the "populist" oriented proposals from the Clinton Administration,
such as raising the maximum marginal rates7 and further limiting the
deductibility of business entertainment, 8 actually have a sound theoretical
basis in tax policy analysis, but other proposals, such as the proposed
investment tax credit 9 and targeted capital gains preference'0 for new small
business investment in no way represent tax reform. Introducing new tax
expenditures will serve only to increase complexity and exacerbate perceived,
if not real, unfairness in the tax system.
Both the reforms of the 1980s and the Clinton Administration's early
proposals for tax reform for the 1990s generally fail to address a number
of significant problems in the individual income tax system. Complexity
and inequity continue to permeate the tax system. Although much of the
complexity is attributable to efforts accurately to measure economic income," more of it probably is attributable to limitations on tax expenditures,' 2 stop-gap restrictions on exploitation of unjustifiable exclusions from
the tax base,' 3 and arbitrary limitations on deductions that serve as disguised
rate increases. 14 Tax expenditures and the resulting ad hoc limitations on
their benefits may be the major culprit in complexity.
Inequity in the tax system derives from two sources. First, despite a
decade of "tax reform," the Internal Revenue Code remains riddled with
exclusions that result in horizontal inequity. Some, such as nonrecognition
for like-kind exchanges, probably are best viewed as historical artifacts.
Others, such as statutory tax-free fringe benefits, are not just remnants of
the past, but continue to multiply. Second, the supply-side economics
emphasis that strongly influenced tax policy in the 1980s has seen the
effective tax rates on very high-income individuals-the top 10%-fall
dramatically relative to the tax rates of the remaining 90% of individual
taxpayers. This presents serious vertical equity issues that must be addressed.

6. TREAs. DEP'T, SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS (1993) [here-

inafter ADMINISTRATMN'S PROPOSALS].
7. Id. at 34-35 (proposing increase in top marginal rate for individuals to 36% with
10% surcharge for very high incomes), 44 (proposing increase in top corporate rate to 36%).

8. Id. at 38 (proposing reduction in amount of deductible entertainment expense from
80% to 50%).
9. Id. at 5-8 (proposing small business and incremental investment tax credit).
10. Id. at 11-12 (proposing targeted capital gains exclusion).
11. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h) (Supp. 1993) (dissallowing deductions for consumer interest);
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T (1987) (providing interest tracing rules).

12. The passive activity loss rules of I.R.C. § 469 and the alternative minimum tax
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 53, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59 are examples.
13. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(e) (Supp. 1993) (limiting amount of deduction for charitable
contributions of appreciated property).
14. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 67 (Supp. 1993) (imposing 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized
deductions), 68 (Supp. 1993) (phasing out itemized deductions for taxpayers whose adjusted
gross income exceeds certain levels), 151(d)(3) (Supp. 1993) (phasing out personal exemptions
for taxpayers whose adjusted gross income exceeds certain levels).
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Traditional tax policy analysis focuses on whether the system (1) raises
adequate revenue, (2) in an equitable manner, (3) without undue complexity,
and (4) without undue interference with the economic system. 5 Since 1981,
however, the dominant characteristic of tax policy debate in the political
arena has been the effect of the current rules and proposed changes on
economic behavior. When tax reform is considered, the focus rarely is on
the tax system as a source of revenues the effectiveness and fairness of
which should be measured against the full range of traditional criteria of
tax policy. Nor is the redistributive function of taxation considered in a
balanced manner. Use of the tax system to redistribute the social product
has been decried. Instead, tax policy analysis has been dominated by
demands for either investment neutrality' 6 or investment incentives,' 7 with
8
pseudo-economists somewhat amazingly demanding both simultaneously.
Advocates of changing the tax system to encourage economic growth do
not seem to view the tax system as a vehicle to collect adequate revenues
fairly or to soften the harsh distributional results that capitalism sometimes
produces. They evaluate the tax system solely as a tool for managing
economic activity, both on a macroeconomic and microeconomic scale. In
other words, much of what passes for "tax policy" in the political arena
today is in reality "tax expenditure policy."' 9
"Fairness" questions sometimes are raised, but even then the notions
of "fairness" that are debated do not appear to correspond to the traditional
tax policy criteria of vertical and horizontal equity. Too often the "fairness"
being discussed is divorced from an analysis of the structure of the income
tax and in reality is a disguised complaint with respect to the overall level
of taxation. Largely because economic analysis dominated the tax policy
criteria in the 1980s, 20 the tax system has continued to be only mildly
progressive, even as the distribution of income and wealth in the United
States has become more concentrated over the past decade and a half.2'
15. See Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteriaof FederalIncome Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REv.
567, 568 (1965) (listing seven factors that shaped federal income tax rates and structure: "(1)
to supply adequate revenue, (2) to achieve practical and workable income tax system, (3) to
impose equal taxes on those who enjoy equal incomes, (4) to assist in achieving stability, (5)
to reduce economic inequality, (6) to avoid impairment of operation of market oriented
economy and (7) to accomplish high degree of harmony between income tax and sought-for
political order").
16. See, e.g., Michael Boskin, Taxation, Savings, and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. POL.
EcoN. S3, S18-25 (1978); David F. Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings,
in TnE GovmsrNvr AND CAPrrAL FoamArioN 11, 20-28 (George M. von Furstenberg ed.,
1980); Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 J. POL. EcoN. 29

(1978).
17. Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J.PUB. EcoN. 77, 89-90 (1976).
18. JACK Kzm', AN AMmEIcAN RENAISSANCE 49-76 (1979).
19. For tax expenditure analysis, see STANLEY S. SuRREY &

PAuL

R.. McDAtNL,

TAX

ExPENDrruREs (1985).

20. See generally TAX

DECADE, supra note 5.
21. See JosEPn A. PECMH.N, TAX REFoRm, Tan RICH AND THE POOR 17-27 (1989);
Houss Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 1992 OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 1454 (Comm.
Print 1992) [hereinafter 1992 GREEN BOOK].
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Two major threads of the debate of recent years have lead us astray in
a our search for sensible tax policy. First, we have misunderstood and
misapplied what economics can tell us about the tax system. Second, in
endeavoring to cure a wide variety of economic and societal problems by
tinkering with the Tax Code, we have lost the forest for the trees; forgetting
the purposes of taxation, we have focused only on certain of its effects.
True tax reform cannot occur without coming to grips with the fallacious
notions that have been generated by these failures. On the positive side,
however, we have become much more astute in our ability to determine the
accrual of economic income, as is evidenced by the numerous changes in
the Tax Code relating to the time value of money. More complete tax
reform will require that we remember the purposes of taxation and apply
our ever developing knowledge about how to measure income in contexts
where we have continued to accept significant mismeasurement of economic
income.
As far as individual taxpayers are concerned, the .tax legislation of the
1980s was as much "deform" as "reform." Not only did the legislation
fail to eliminate many horizontal inequities in the tax base, but it introduced
new irrationalities in the tax base and gave rise to a rate structure that is
both unfair and fails to raise adequate revenue. One need look no further
than the Annual Budget of the United States for any year in the last decade
to see that the tax system fails to raise adequate revenue. The perpetual
large deficits of the federal government, which, measured by standards of
the rest of the industrialized world, spends only a modest percentage of
gross domestic product, is primafacie proof of this failure. To some extent,
the failure of the tax system to collect adequate revenues is attributable to
the attacks during the 1980s on the progressivity of the rate structure that
characterized the income tax system for most of its first seventy years.
II.

PRoa~ssmw RATES

A.

Taxing Millionaires

One of the major goals of future tax reform should be a renewal of
the ideals of progressive income taxation. Over the past decade and a half,
the effective tax rate on families in the top 1% of the population by income
class-a group of families with 2.5 million members2-has been dramatically
reduced while the share of income realized by this group has dramatically
increased. 23 This group's effective federal income tax rate fell from 35.576
in 1977 to 31.7% in 1980 and to 26.7% in 1989; by 1993 its effective tax
rate was projected to have increased only slightly, to 28.8%.24 From 1977
to 1989, the income of this group increased by 80.3%, while the income of

22. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 21, at 1517, Table 18.
23. Id. at 1512, Chart 1.
24. Id. at 1510, Table 14.
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all families in the United States increased by only 15.5%; the income of
the lowest 40% actually decreased over this period. 25 The after-tax income
of the top 1% increased by 104.4%, while overall after-tax incomes increased
by only 15.6%; after-tax incomes of the bottom 40% of the population
decreased. 26
These are striking comparisons that have important implications with
respect to both the fairness of the tax system and its ability to raise adequate
revenues. While it is true that the share of total federal taxes paid by the
top 1% of income earners increased from 13.6% in 1977 to between 15.4%
and 15.9% during the 1988-1993 period,27 this does not indicate that the
tax system has become more progressive. The share of pre-tax adjusted
family income realized by this group increased from 8.3% in 1977 to 13.4%
in 1988, and the pre-tax income of the top 1% increased by a much higher
percentage than its share of taxes paid.21 The group's share of disposable
after-tax income increased from 7.3% in 1977 to 12.8% in 1988.29 From
1977 to 1989, the effective federal income tax rate for the top 1% fell
by 17.9%, while the overall effective income tax rate fell only .9%.10
During the past decade opponents of progressive taxation, advocating
proportional or slightly progressive taxation, have raised two arguments in
their successful attack on the historic rate progressivity for high income
taxpayers. One, which finds its roots in the seminal work by Blum and
Kalvin, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,3 was to assert that the
burden of proof was to be born by advocates of progressive taxation. From
this premise, "flat taxers" argued that unless the diminishing marginal
utility of money could be theoretically proven, progressive taxation could
not be justified. These flat-tax-rate advocates wound up their case with the
conclusion that the diminishing marginal utility of money could not be
proven, and that therefore proportional taxation should be adopted.
The second line of attack on progressivity was based on economic
analysis of capital investment, and assertions that high tax rates stifled
economic growth. Low tax rates, it was asserted, would bring bounteous
growth in the gross domestic product.12 The low-flat-tax proponents largely
ignored the issue of vertical equity.3

25. Id. at 1511, Table 15.
26. Id. at 1513, Table 16.
27. Id. at 1528, Table 28.
28. Id. at 1521, Table 22.
29. Id. at 1520, Table 21.
30. Id. at 1529, Table 29.
31. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1952).
32. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX

(1983).
33. See Daniel L. Simmons, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: An Overview, 1987 B.Y.U.
LAw REv. 151, 167-171.
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One of the major issues for tax policy in the 1990s is to re-evaluate the
flattening of the tax rates that was the centerpiece of tax legislation in the
1980s.34 Even if it cannot be theoretically proven that money has diminishing
marginal utility, simple observation tells us that across broad ranges of
income, money clearly has diminishing marginal utility. Even without first
hand data, one need only watch the television show "Robin Leach's
Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous" or read about Malcolm Forbes' birthday
party in Morocco to realize that individuals with large fortunes or incomes
are not as careful about how they spend their dollars as those of modest
means-the middle class, however it may be defined.35 If equity in the tax
rates requires an attempt to approximate equal sacrifice or to measure
"ability to pay" across broad ranges of incomes, rates should be far more
progressive than the current rate schedule.
The economic arguments against progressive taxation should not be
controlling. First, the argument that low rates are necessary for economic
stimulation proves too much because it can be carried forward to support
regressive taxation. If high income taxpayers should pay taxes at a marginal
rate no higher than middle income taxpayers because their higher propensity
to save will increase investment, and thus productivity, why not reduce their
tax rates even further and allow them to save even more? Moreover, for
the purpose of this type of analysis, the overall tax rate-taxes as a percent
of gross domestic product-is more important than the tax rate on any
particular income group. From this perspective, it is worth noting that the
United States is a tax haven among industrialized democracies. No important
industrialized democracy has a lower tax burden, and many have signifi36
cantly higher taxes.
Second, the argument is based on a theory, not on incontrovertible
fact. It usually is based on analysis of income from capital, not from
salaries, and it may not be true even insofar as it applies to income from
capital. Even though the theory that higher yields to capital will increase
savings and investment is plausible and almost universally believed, empirical
linkage is weak at best. 37 Furthermore, there is a respectable competing
34. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1987).

35. See generally Mark S. Stein, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income and Progressive
Taxation: A Critique of The Uneasy Case, 12 No. ILL. L. REv. 373 (1992) (arguing that
diminishing marginal utility of income theory is correct).
36. LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG JAPAN,
EUROPE, AND AMERICA 269 (1992) (presenting table of taxes as percentage of gross domestic
product for industrialized democracies, based on OECD data).
37. See Robert E. Hall, Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption, 96 J. POL. ECON.
339 (1988); David A. Starrett, Effect of Taxes on Saving, in UNEASY COMPROMs: PROBLEM
OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSumpTON TAx 237-68 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988) (stating
that empirical and theoretical bases for savings behavior have been elusive) [hereinafter UNEASY
COMPROMISE]; George M. Von Furstenberg, Saving, in How TAXEs AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
327, 328, 365 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (stating that empirical data
do not conclusively prove that savings incentives increase national savings rate) [hereinafter
How TAXES].
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theory, based on differing assumptions regarding savings motivations, that
for many people higher yields to capital may decrease savings,38 and the
empirical data indicate that over the long term the United States personal
savings rate has varied inversely with the yield to capital.3 9
In addition, unlike the millionaires of earlier eras, many current high
income taxpayers realize a substantial part of their incomes from salaries
and compensation for personal services. 40 Although some economic models
conclude that high tax rates will constrict the labor supply, 41 it is questionable
whether they take into account fully limitations on workers' ability easily
to expand and contract their work effort in response to tax rates. Notwithstanding these economic models and popular belief that taxes affect work
effort, most empirical studies indicate that the work effort of primary wage
earners does not change significantly in response to after tax pay changes;
the data indicating responsiveness is based on the second wage earner in
42
families .
The partial victory of the "flat taxers" should be repudiated and
progressivity in the rate structure restored. Small steps already have been
taken, with the introduction of a 31% bracket and current proposals for
new 36 and 39.6% brackets applicable to taxable incomes reported on joint
returns in excess of $140,000 and $250,000, respectively. 4 These proposals
are salutary,4 but do not go far enough. Marginal income tax rates for
those at the very top of the income distribution should be increased even
more. Doing so will improve vertical equity and enhance revenues.
Notwithstanding that the deficit cannot be cured solely by taxing the
wealthy, there is good reason to believe that if millionaires-taxpayers with
annual incomes in excess of $1,000,000-were taxed at rates that applied
as recently as 1985, federal tax receipts would be significantly increased. In
1985, taxpayers with an adjusted gross income of $1,000,000 or more
reported aggregate taxable income of $35,995,725,000 and paid taxes of
$17,591,119,000. 4s As a group the 1985 millionaires paid taxes at an effective
38. BENTAMIN FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EcoNOMC PoLicy 252-55 (1988) (arguing that higher returns could "depress" savings because
people may save less in order to produce same future value at higher interest rate).
39. Jonathan Skinner & Daniel Feenberg, The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform on
Personal Saving, in Do TAxEs MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAx REFoRm ACT OF 1986 50,
58-63 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990) [hereinafter Do TAXEs MATTER].
40. See Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost' for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of
IgnoranceAlong the.Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REv. OF LAW & SOC. CHANGE
951, 957-59 (1990-91).
41. See Jerry A. Hausman, Labor Supply, in How TAXES, supra note 33, at 27-83
(concluding high taxes impair economic efficiency and constrict labor supply).
42. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 242-43; Vane G. Gravelle, Behavioral Responses to
Proposed High-Income Tax Rate Increases: An Evaluation of the Feldsiein-FeenbergStudy,
59 TAx NOTES 1097 (May 24, 1993).

43.

ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS,

supra note 6, at 32-35.

44. Imposing the 39.6% rate through a "surtax" rather than an express rate bracket is
not salutary. Surtaxes should be eschewed in favor of clearly visible rates.
45. Im-nRNAL REvENuE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INcomE BULLETiN 7-10 (Winter 1986-1987)
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rate of 48.87% of taxable income; the average income tax liability was
$922,256.4 In 1988, taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $1,000,000
or more in the aggregate reported $150,744,777,000 of taxable income and
paid income taxes of $42,422,678,000. 47 While the total tax collections from
millionaires increased by approximately $25,000,000, the average income tax
liability fell by approximately $240,000 to $684,546.41 As a group, the
millionaires paid income taxes at an effective rate of 28.14% of taxable
income-an average rate decrease of twenty percentage points. Although
due to base broadening the effective tax rate on the very top income earners
did not drop quite as much when computed with respect to expanded
definitions of income, 49 there is no a priori reason not to be concerned with
the change in taxes as a percentage of taxable income. Indeed, since
politically we have decided-rightly or wrongly-that "taxable income" is
the base on which the income tax is levied, unless we have some other taxes
that impact particular income classes highly disproportionately, taxes paid
as a percentage of taxable income may be the best measure of "effective
tax rates" in determining the proper level of progressivity in income taxation.
Applying the twenty percentage point decrease in tax rates to the approximately $150,000,000,000 of taxable income reported by millionaires in 1988,
and ignoring behavioral effects, would indicate a revenue loss of approximately $30,000,000,000 as a result of the decreased rates.
Serious consideration should be given to raising the marginal rate on
incomes in excess of $1,000,000 to 50%. Rates for taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes between $500,000 and $1,000,000 should be increased as well.
In 1985, taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes between $500,000 and
$1,000,000 paid an average income tax of $238,813 on an average taxable
income of $516,008-an effective rate of 46.28%.1 0 In 1988, this group had
average taxable income of $589,656, but the average income taxes paid had
fallen to $167,097-an effective rate of 28.4%.51 Total taxable income for
this group in 1988 was $67,552,225,000.52 Thus, assuming away behavioral
effects of the rate difference, the eighteen percentage point drop in average

(listing preliminary data for 1985) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DATA]. This represents 19,016
returns. The total adjusted gross income of the millionaires represented 1.93% of aggregate
AGI, and the taxes paid represented 5.35% of total taxes.
46. Id. at 10.
47. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INcoME-1988, INDrvmuAL IN COas TAX
RETuRNs 18-19 (1991) [hereinafter SOI-1988].
48. The total adjusted gross income of the 62,065 millionaires in 1988 represented 5.5%
of aggregate AGI, and the taxes paid represented 10.3% of total taxes. Id. at 18.
49. See TAx DECADE, supra note 5, at 195 (containing chart showing effective federal
tax rules).
50. PRELUMNARY DATA, supra note 45, at 7-10. This represents approximately 39,400
returns. Id. at 7-10.
51. SOI-1988, supra note 47, at 18-19.
52. Id. at 18.
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rates cost the Treasury over $12,000,000,000. 53 If incomes above $250,000
are taxed at a 39% marginal rate, and incomes above $1,000,000 are taxed
at 50%, a 45% rate should be applied between $500,000 and $1,000,000. '
Of course it is overly simplistic to conclude that retaining the 1985
effective rates would have increased 1988 tax collections by approximately
$40,000,000,000. Surely the lower rates had some behavioral effects and
increasing the rates will as well. Perhaps if a 50% tax had been levied since
1988 Madonna would have performed fewer concerts or failed to write her
infamous book and earned a few million dollars less, thereby decreasing
her tax liability. 4 But it is likewise overly simplistic to conclude that
substantially higher rates on millionaires would not raise very significant
amounts of revenue for the government. Although some economists theorize
that as income tax rates increase, work effort generally diminishes, to do
so in many cases they must assume away market-driven requirements of
continued undiminished work effort. Common sense tells us that they very
well may overstate the case. In some cases, the flexibility simply does not
exist. The hundreds of professional athletes in this group hardly could tell
team management two-thirds of the way through the season that the Tax
Code has eliminated their incentive to finish the season. In many cases, atthe-margin work effort may be motivated more by nonmonetary factors
such as interest and prestige. 55 It is doubtful that multi-million dollar a year
corporate executives, financiers, and Wall Street lawyers will scale back
56
their work efforts to the extent that the economy noticeably will be harmed.
Perhaps, following the lead of Ronald Reagan, who claimed that high tax
rates caused him to make fewer movies than he otherwise would have made,
Bill Cosby and Michael Jordan will make fewer television commercials, but
diminished work effort by entertainers, or financiers for that matter, is of
little import to the economy. Their incomes represent a reallocation of
production far more than they represent new production.
Furthermore, it is difficult to accept arguments that "fairness" requires
lower rates and militates against tax rates in the 50% range for millionaires.
The average taxable income-which understates disposable income-for the
7
61,896 millionaires who reported taxable income in 1988 was $2,435,453.1
It is difficult to sympathize with the plight of an individual left with more
than $1.2 of after-tax income. In fact, the converse is true. It is difficult
to justify a tax system that tolerates the relatively low effective tax rates

53. 18% x $67,552,225,000 = $12,159,400,500.
54. Less work effort by Madonna might be a positive result in and of itself. See
MADONNA, SEx (1992).

55. See RICHARD A. MUSORAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 300 (5th ed. 1989) (stating high wage earners may be less responsive to changes
in net wage rate because nonwage factors such as prestige, interest in work, etc. may control).

56. See THomAs H. SANDERS, EFcTs OF

TAXATION ON

ExEcuTIvEs 17-32 (1951) (con-

taining Harvard Business School study concluding that executive work effort was unaffected
by taxes at time when maximum tax bracket exceeded 80%).
57. SOI-1988, supra note 47, at 18.
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that the Tax Code currently applies to such large incomes. In 1988, more
than twenty corporate Chief Executive Officers or chairmen received compensation of $6,000,000 dollars or more, eleven made more than $10,000,000,
topped by Michael Eisner of Walt Disney Studios.s A dozen Wall Street
financiers reportedly topped the $50 million mark in profits that same year2 9
The top ten earners among lawyers reportedly each received more than
$5,000,000 that year. 60 At these income levels, marginal tax rates in excess
of 50% could be justified.
Proponents of low flat taxes no doubt will argue that increased progressivity would stifle investment incentive and work effort. The burden of
proof, however, should rest on those trying to justify retention of low
marginal tax rates on millionaires. The tax policy analysis of the 1980s,
based on welfare economics, focused on "efficiency" in the economy.6
Efficiency maximizes gross domestic product-it produces the biggest pie. '
But economic efficiency is not necessarily in and of itself the paramount
social goal. How tax policy affects the distribution of gross domestic
product-how the pie is sliced-also is very important. 62 Perhaps this
question was not considered thoroughly because of the siren song that a
bigger pie will result in bigger slices for all. But that is not necessarily so.
Notwithstanding analytical arguments against progression based on wel63
fare economics, progressive taxation may be justified on political gr6unds.
Over the past decade and a half the share of wealth accumulated by the
top decile of the population undeniably also has increased. The concentration
is even more pronounced when the top 1% is compared with the remaining
9906. There are sound reasons for mitigating this growing economic disparity
through more progressive income taxation. Mitigation of vast disparities in
wealth helps to insure that democratic systems function. The populace must
believe that the overall political-economic system is fair. If the results are
too disparate, the fairness of the system is questionable. Finally, concentration of wealth and incomes in a very small segment of society can result in
an unjustifiable concentration of political power.
Tax policy for the 1990s should examine how the pie is sliced as well
as how big a pie a country can bake. A simple example illustrates why this
is necessary. Assume a society with five members, A, B, C, D, and E. A
and B each have income of $10, C and D each have income of $12, and

58. KEVIN Pm.uIPs, THE PoLrrIcs OF RICH AND POOR, WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AmRmATH 179 (1990) (providing table comparing chief executive
compensation for years 1981 and 1988).
59. Id. at 173.
60. Id. at 176.
61. John B. Shoven & Paul Taubman, Saving, Capital Income, and Taxation, in THE
EcONoMCS OF TAXATION 203, 204 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).
62. See Richard A. Westin, When One-Eyed Accountants are Kings: A Primer on
Microeconomics, Income Taxes, and the Shibboleth of Efficiency, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1099
(1985) (discussing efficiency of tax system in terms of equity).
63. See Harold M. Groves, Toward a Social Theory of Progressive Taxation, 9 NAT'L
TAX J. 27 (1956) (discussing progressivity in terms of societal values).
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E has income of $56 ; the total product of the society is $100. Suppose
now that the society requires an aggregate contribution of $30 for national
defense, and that $8 is the minimum amount necessary to avoid privation.
The first proposal is to levy a 10% tax on A and B, a 20% tax on C and
D, all of whom will continue to produce as before, and 50% tax on E,
who because of the tax burden will not be as productive and will now
produce only $44. A and B each will be left with $9, C and D each will
be left with $9.60, and E will be left with $22. As a result of the progressive
tax, the gross domestic product of this society fell from $100 to $94, of
which $30 was allocated to the public sector for common defense and $64
was retained in the private sector.
An alternative proposal is to levy a flat rate 30% tax, which we are
assured will not affect productivity and thus will collect $30. A and B each
will pay $3, leaving them $7 for consumption and in a state of privation.
C and D each will pay $3.6, leaving them slightly above privation. E will
pay $16.8, leaving $39.2 for private consumption instead of the $22 E was
left under the progressive model. Welfare economists will tell us-possibly
correctly-that the proportional tax is more efficient than the progressive
tax. But the inquiry should not stop there. Although aggregate production
of goods and services under the proportionate tax may be greater, all but
one of the citizens of the hypothetical society are worse off under the
proportional tax than under the progressive tax. This demonstrates that
economic efficiency is not inherently an all encompassing goal. It is but
one element of the overall calculus, which must take into account other
societal values. If the social economic values of the hypothetical society are
based on a leximin welfarist theory of distributive justice, the economically
efficient proportional tax system will be rejected in favor of the less efficient
progressive tax system because the latter is fairer. 64 Furthermore, the proportional tax validly may be rejected in favor of the progressive tax simply
because the latter reduces the inequality between E and the remaining
65
members of the society.
Admittedly, this analysis does not definitively answer the question of
how progressive taxation ought to be, particularly at the upper income
levels. Under a vertical equity analysis, as opposed to an optimal tax welfare
economics analysis, the issue becomes one of distributive justice. The more
interested one is in using the tax system to mitigate economic inequality
caused by the market, the more progressive one believes the tax system
ought to be. As Henry Simon stated, "The case for drastic progression in
taxation must be rested on the case against inequality-on the ethical or

64. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1949-50 (1987) (praising Rawisian
approach to distributive justice through progressive taxation). But see Charles R. O'Kelley,
Jr., Tax Policy for Post-LiberalSociety: A Flat-Tax-InspiredRedefinition of the Purposeand
Ideal Structure of a ProgressiveIncome Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 727 (1985) (arguing that flat
tax with appropriate exemptions is "progressive" and just).
65. H NRY L. SIMoNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATON 24-25 (1938).
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aesthetic judgment that the prevailing distribution of wealth and income
reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or
unlovely.'"' It has been said that the decision ultimately is one of personal
preference, not logic.6 7 Collectively, however, the personal preferences of
the citizenry are a political decision, and thus the proper degree of progressivity ultimately is a political issue. Economics cannot dictate that we
enact a Tax Code that maximizes production. The polity validly may choose
to mitigate inequality at the expense of production.
B.

Capital Gains

Increasing the marginal rates on high income taxpayers should not be
permitted to result in the reintroduction of a significant preferential tax rate
for capital gains. To the contrary, even the mild rate preference provided
by the 28% maximum rate under Code section 1(h) should be repealed.
Inflationary gains aside, capital gains are no different than any other income.
They either can be spent on consumption or invested. Thus, under income
taxation principles, capital gains should be taxed at the same rate as other
income. Any significant capital gains preference substantially erodes the
impact of a graduated progressive rate structure. A large percentage of the
income of millionaires is realized as capital gain, and a large percentage of
all capital gain is realized by those millionaires. In 1988, 75% of the returns
with an adjusted gross income of $1,000,000 or more reported net capital
gains.6 8 As a group, their gains were almost $58 billion, averaging $1,229,988
per return.6 9 This group, which represented less than .5% of all70 individual
tax returns, reported approximately 38% of total capital gains.
Preferential taxation of capital gains is based on the theory that capital
gains taxation reduces economic efficiency and that reduced rates on capital
gains promote economic growth. This argument proves too, much. The same
can be said with respect to taxation of any income, particularly income
from capital. Arguments for preferential taxation of capital gains based on
welfare economics efficiency logically cannot be stopped short of exempting
yields to capital from taxation entirely. If the arguments are to be accepted,
income taxation should be abandoned and a cash flow consumption tax
should be adopted. It may be debated whether our current system is a
conscious hybrid or a merely a flawed income tax system. But it is clear
that the current mixed system is more likely to create both inequities and
inefficiencies than either a well designed income tax system or consumption

66. Id. at 18-19.
67. Bo~is I. Bn-MER, Second Lecture, in CIARUEs 0. GAAvIN & BoRis I. BrrrxER, THE
INcomE TAx: How PRoaaRssIvE SHOULD IT BE 28 (1969).
68. Calculated from SOI-1988, supra note 47, at 21, 27.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 21, 27.
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tax system. 7' Thus we should try to move toward one or the other. Whether
to tax income or consumption is more a matter of theology than reason

and logic. It turns on whether one believes income from capital ought to
be taxed. I am a believer in income taxation because I believe it to be the
fairer of the two systems.
Even stopping short of a consumption tax, the economic argument for
true preferential rates on capital gains, as opposed to the rough justice

equivalency of an inflation adjustment or an averaging function, is based
on the assumption that most capital gains are reinvested. To the extent this
is not true, the argument for preferential rates is fallacious.7 2 Furthermore,
even if it is true that most capital gains are reinvested, the argument in
favor of preferential taxation of capital gains turns on the validity of the

assertions that lower taxation of capital gains increases the amount of risky
investment and that the benefits of the resulting increased production inure
to society generally. There is no persuasive evidence that a preferential rate

for realized capital gains encourages investment in productive assets.73 Even
if it did, if the benefits do not in fact trickle down but are retained by the
individuals realizing capital gains, there is little or no reason to provide a
lower tax rate for capital gains. 74 Finally, allowing either a preferential rate
for all capital gains or just for capital gains that are rolled over into a new
investment75 unfairly discriminates in favor of established wealth holders
against those trying to accumulate new wealth by saving income from labor
because new savings must come from fully taxed income.

Even if there is a tax-expenditure-based benefit from taxing capital
gains at a preferential rate, the benefits of the tax expenditure must be

weighed against the complexity engendered by a capital gains tax preference.
That complexity is enormous, and economists do not pay attention to the
cost of complexity in the tax system as much as they should.7 6 As long as
the Tax Code provided a significant rate preference for capital gains, some

71. But see Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption
Tax, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1145 (1992) (arguing hybrid income-consumption tax has several benefits).
72. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Consumption of CapitalGains, 55 TAX NOTES 957 (May
18, 1992) (arguing that reduction in capital gain rates causes consumption rather than reinvestment of capital).
73. Henry J.Aaron, Lessons for Tax Reform, in Do TAXEs MATrER?, supra note 39,
at 320, 326-27.
74. See Interview with Martin D. Ginsburg, 12 SECnON OF TAX. NEWSLETTER (ABA,
Wash. D.C.), Fall, 1992, at 6. Mr. Ginsburg stated:
[T]he argument for preferential treatment is supposed to be that it encourages
investment and therefore is good for the country. It was popular not too long ago
to refer to the benefits "trickling down" until, I guess, people decided that they
had been trickled on long enough, so new rhetoric is now being used.
Id. at 8.
75. See Cynthia Blum, Rollover: An Alternative Treatment for Capital Gains, 41 TAX
L. REv. 383 (1986).
76. See J.Gregory Ballentine, Tax Policy and Revenue Sufficiency in the 1980's, in
PERSONAL SAVING, CoNsumrpoN, AND TAX POLICY 34, 37 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1992)
(containing confession by economist).
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taxpayers, with the aid of an army of tax lawyers and accountants strove
mightily to arrange business transactions in a structure that would result in
the realization of capital gains rather than ordinary income; others, with
the same soldiers, structured transactions that before taxes did no better
than break even, but created ordinary losses and capital gains that nettedout but gave rise to tax savings. Many provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code are concerned primarily with preventing the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gains.77 Included among them are some of the most
complex and difficult to apply tax rules. The complexity engendered by
capital gain preferences makes the law difficult to understand and makes
planning business transactions more complex. Not only must initially business motivated transactions be analyzed to determine if the tax burden can
be reduced, but energies are diverted. from business motivated transactions
to transactions motivated almost solely by tax planning. This is not desirable.
Finally, the arguments for preferential rates based on "bunching" due
to isolated realization of gains and the over-taxation of inflationary gains
cannot justify a preferential rate structure at all like any ever incorporated
in the Internal Revenue Code or politically proposed. Bunching may not be
as much of a problem as often is asserted. The data indicate that a high
percentage of taxpayers who realize capital gains do so regularly.78 Nevertheless some taxpayers do bunch capital gains,7 9 and therefore may face a
higher than normal marginal tax rate. The most 4ppropriate response to
this problem would be to provide an averaging rule along the lines of
former Code sections 1301-1305, which were repealed by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.80
As for the inflationary gains argument, neither a maximum rate of tax
on capital gains, as provided in Code section 1(h), nor an across the board
rate reduction, like that in former Code section 1202, comes anywhere near
approximating an adjustment to eliminate inflationary gains other than by
accident. The only way to eliminate inflationary gains is to index basis, as
has been widely suggested. 8 ' It would, however, be unwise to index basis
77. See, e.g., §§ 302 (1988) (redemptions), 305 (Supp. 1993) (distributions of stock and
stock rights), 306 (Supp. 1993) (section 306 stock), 341 (collapsible corporations), 355 (Supp.
1993) (spin-offs, split-offs and split-ups), 541, 543 & 545 (Supp. 1993) and 542, 544, 546, &
547 (1988) (personal holding corporations), 732(b) (1988) (basis of property distributed by
liquidating partnership), 751 (1988) ("hot assets"), 1239 (1988) (gain from sale of depreciable
property between related taxpayers), 1245 (Supp. 1993) (depreciation recapture on personal
property), 1250 (Supp. 1993) (depreciation recapture on real property), 1254 (Supp. 1993)
(recapture of intangible drilling costs), and 1256 (1988) (depreciation recapture on real property).
78. See Albert J. Davis, Measuring the DistributionalEffects of Tax Changes for the
Congress, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 257, 259-60 (1991) (explaining how multi-year research confirmed
capital gains tax cut mainly benefitted those with taxable incomes of $75,000 and over).
79. See Joseph J. Minarik, Capital Gains, in How TAXEs, supra note 37, at 241, 251
80. I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (repealed 1986) (allowing income averaging). Indeed, if a serious
graduated rate schedule is reintroduced it would be altogether proper to reenact the income
averaging provisions in some form.
81. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation,
in UNEASY COMPROMXSE, supra note 37, at 347.
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without also indexing debt, and indexing both debt and basis would be very
complex.12 Thus, taxation of gains attributable solely to inflation, to the
extent it occurs, is a problem that is not easily solvable. Perhaps, however,
it is a "problem" that from a practical perspective might not require a
solution.
If the model on which the tax system is based is an accretion income
tax, gains should be taxed annually as they accrue.,3 Thus, because of the
realization requirement of current law, taxation of capital gains is deferred
and capital gains thus are undertaxed relative to current yield. This deferral
is valuable. Both the risk of illusory gains attributable to inflation and the
benefit of deferral due to the realization requirement increases as the holding
period increases, and the two may largely offset one another, even though
imperfectly."
C. Low Income Allowances
Reform is likewise necessary at the lower end of the income scale. Low
income individuals are relieved from an income tax burden through three
major allowances: the personal and dependency exemptions, the standard
deduction, and the earned income credit. Currently, as adjusted for inflation,
the personal exemptions and standard deduction establish a tax threshold
that exceeds the poverty line for household units of two or more individuals,
whether spouses or parent and dependent child. Single individuals, however,
pass the threshold for taxation at $5,900 of adjusted gross income, which
is nearly $1,000 below the poverty income guideline published by the United
States Department of Heath and Human Services. 5 An additional allowance
is provided through the refundable earned income credit in Code section
32, but the earned income credit is not available to single taxpayers with
no dependents.
All low income taxpayers who earn wages or self-employment income
are subject to the social security tax even though they may be below the
poverty level. Elimination of the effective burden of social security taxes
for families below the poverty level was bne the rationales for the introduction of the earned income credit. 86 From the outset, however, the earned
income credit has served dual purposes. It can refund more than the social
security tax on wages. Thus, it is a low income allowance for qualifying

82. For a comprehensive indexing proposal, see 2 TREAs.
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FAnESS, SIMPLIcIT, AND ECONOMC GROWTH 177-200 [hereinafter FAIRNEss, SIMPLIcrITy].

83. See David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986).
84. See Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steurle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in
UNEASY COMPROMISE, supra note 37, at 347, 353-56; Calvin H. Johnson, The Undertaxation
of Holding Gains, 55 TAx NOTES 807 (May 11, 1992).
85. Jonathan Barry Forman, Poverty Levels and Federal Tax Thresholds: 1992, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 519 (1992).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 19, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1975).
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taxpayers. 87 To some extent, it can be viewed as a tax expenditure as well,
because the particular structure was designed to encourage work and reduce
welfare dependency.88
Viewed as a refund of social security taxes, the earned income credit
reflects some implausible policy decisions. 9 The most important qualification
factor, apart from the income ceiling, is that a "qualified child" under the
age of nineteen, with limited exceptions, lives with the taxpayer. 90 Thus, as
previously noted, the credit is not available to single taxpayers; nor is it
available to childless married taxpayers. This differing treatment makes no
sense. There is no rational reason why childless taxpayers below the poverty
level should be any less entitled to a refund of social security taxes than
should be taxpayers with dependent children. 91
Analyzing the earned income credit as an additional low income allowance presents other difficulties. Because the earned income credit provides
a significant refund to a qualifying taxpayer whose income is below the
taxable income threshold for income tax liability, the credit does not appear
to be an element of the normative tax system. Rather it is wholly a tax
expenditure, the purpose of which appears to be to encourage people with
minor children to seek employment. As such, analysis of its propriety and
effectiveness has nothing to do with tax theory. Nevertheless the credit is
intended to serve substantially the same function as the personal exemptions
and standard deduction-to exempt a minimum amount of income from
taxation.
From this perspective, the structure of the earned income credit again
is difficult to justify. The problem is not that the allowance is a disappearing
credit. A low income allowance in the form of a disappearing credit may
make as much sense as personal exemptions. It clearly makes more sense
than the current rule in Code section 151(d)(3), which "recaptures" the
benefit of the personal exemptions through a surtax that creates a rate
bubble. The primary problems lie in the limitations on the availability of
the earned income credit tax and the inordinate administrative complexity
created and imposed on low income taxpayers. 92 It would be fairer to
remove all low income taxpayers, with the possible exception of dependent
students, from the tax rolls, not just those with dependent children, and
far easier to remove low income individuals from the tax rolls solely through
expanded personal exemptions.

87. See S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
88. Id. at 33.
89. See Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers Problems and
Proposals, 45 TAx L. REv. 121, 140-42 (1989) (discussing need for simplification of earned
income credit).
90. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1993).
91. Students who are dependents of their parents might present a different case.
92. See James E. Williamson & Francine J. Lipman, The Earned Income Tax Credit:
Too Complex for the Targeted Taxpayers? 57 TAx NoTEs 789 (Nov. 9, 1992).
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Congress ought to re-examine completely the method for providing low
income allowances. 93 Viewed as a whole, the current system is incomplete
and unnecessarily complex, largely because the standard deduction and
earned income credit serve dual roles. It is important that we continue to
keep individuals and families below the poverty level off the tax roles. As
far as the income tax is concerned, that goal should be accomplished solely
and completely through expanded personal exemptions. Alternatively, if it
is considered proper to limit the benefit of low income allowances to tax
reduction at the lowest rate, rather than phasing them out altogether, a
credit equal to fifteen percent of the exempt amount could be substituted
for the deductions. The standard deduction should be abolished,9 and the
earned income credit should be revised to function as a mechanism for
refunding social security taxes. Whether Congress in addition to removing
the poor from the tax rolls wants to adopt a negative income tax, of which
the earned income might be considered a variant, is another question
entirely. If a negative income tax provision is desirable, it should be designed
to operate independently of and in addition to provisions designed merely
to remove the working poor from the tax rolls.
To use personal exemptions as the sole method of eliminating income
tax liability of low income taxpayers requires reconsideration of the manner
in which personal exemptions are computed. Nothing dictates that each
personal exemption on an income tax return be the same amount. It would
be quite logical to provide for a large personal exemption for the first
taxpayer on the return and exemptions of decreasing amounts for the second
taxpayer on a joint return and dependents claimed on either a single, head
of household, or joint return. 95 The specific amounts might be keyed to the
poverty level as determined annually. To prevent the generous initial allowance from being claimed by dependent minor children with unearned income,
it should not be allowed to minor children living with a parent.
D. Rate Bubbles
Numerous tax allowances are phased out as income increases. Some,
like the earned income credit, are targeted allowances. Others, like the
deduction for individual retirement accounts for employed taxpayers who
participate in an employer sponsored qualified retirement plan, are based
on volitional behavior. Still others limit the availability of otherwise universal
allowances, such as the phase-out of personal and dependency exemptions
93. See generally Jonathan Barry Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Creditfor the Working Poor, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. Ray. 41 (1988).
94. To the extent that the standard deduction is viewed a floor for tax expenditures, if
it is determined that such a provision is desirable, Code section 67 should be revised and
expanded.
95. The Tariff Act of 1913 allowed each taxpayer a $3,000 personal exemption, with
married taxpayers allowed an additional $1,000 exemption. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §
II.C., 38 Stat. 114, 168. No dependency exemption for children was allowed until 1917, when
it was set at $200. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1203(1), 40 Stat. 300, 331.
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in Code section 151(d)(3).16 Phase-outs of various deductions and credits
occur at varying income levels.Y All of these phase-out or limitation rules
produce the same strange effect on the rate structure. They create marginal
rate "bubbles" that result in marginal rates decreasing at income levels
above the bubble. 98 It is difficult, if not impossible, to justify regressive
marginal rates at any income levels. Accordingly, the use of phase-outs and
allowances that require phase-outs should be re-examined. Because of the
variety of contexts in which phase-outs are used, they must be examined
individually. An argument may be made that some of the phase-outs relate
to tax expenditures, and that they therefore do not present a regressive tax
rate issue.
The rate bubble resulting from the phase-out of the personal exemptions,
while possibly not creating the highest bubble rate, may well be the farthest
beyond the pale from the perspective of tax theory. The object of this
provision is to restore some of the progressivity to average tax rates that
was dramatically reduced by the Tax Reform of 1986. The intent was
salutary, but the implementation is flawed. The particular device of the
phase-out of the personal exemptions in section 151(d)(3) was a compromise
between the House, which in 1990 proposed replacement of the then existing
five percent surtax in former section l(g), which phased-out both personal
exemptions and the benefit of the fifteen percent bracket, with an explicit
top rate bracket of thirty-three percent, and the Senate, which had not
proposed any change.9 By compromising on a thirty-one percent top rate
coupled with a phase-out of the personal exemptions, Congress adopted an
effective maximum rate in excess of thirty-one percent but perpetuated the
regressivity that characterized former Code section l(g). Furthermore, between the phase-out of personal exemptions and the phase-out of the benefits
of the fifteen percent bracket, the phase-out of the exemptions had the
more curious effect. The rate bubble increased as family size increased. If
tax burdens are intended to reflect ability to pay, between two families with
equal incomes but of different sizes, the family with fewer members should
have a higher tax burden. Section 151(d)(3), however, can result in equal
tax burdens for the two families.
Vanishing exemptions are not necessary to achieve any given level of
progressivity.'00 The effect of tax allowances can be phased out without

96. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (Supp. 1993). This provision is scheduled to expire after 1995.
97. See Allen H. Lerman & Jim Cilke, The Distribution of Effective MarginalTax Rates,
84 ANNUAL CoNF. OF THE NAT'L TAX Asso.-TAx INST. OF AM. PROC. 245, 251-52 (1991)
(depicting rate bumps graphically).
98. Glenn E. Coven, Congress as an Indian-Giver: "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAx REv. 505, 505-06 (1987); Philip J. Harmelink
& Phyllis V. Copeland, 'Hidden Taxes' Through Phaseoutsand Floors: Assessment and Policy
Implications, 58 TAX NOTES 77 (Jan. 4, 1993).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1028-1030 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2733, 2735.
100. TREAs. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAx REFORM 106 (1977) [hereinafter BLuEPRINTS].
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creating a marginal rate bubble. To do so simply requires use of a larger
number of graduated rate brackets, with the phase-out being effected
through one or more increasing rate brackets above the lowest nominal
bracket but below the highest nominal bracket. 101 When dealing with the
personal and dependency allowances, however, the issue is a bit more
complex because different numbers of dependency exemptions may be
claimed by taxpayers who are identical in all respects other than the number
of dependent children. For this reason, phasing out personal and dependency
exemptions without a rate bubble would require separate rate schedules that
varied with the number of personal and dependency exemptions on the
return. This should not be a problem. It would present no significant
administrative complexity, and actually may be more theoretically proper
than the current system. At the very least, Code section 151(d)(3), phasing
out personal and dependency exemptions, should be repealed or allowed to
expire, and it should be replaced with additional graduated rate brackets
for high income taxpayers.
Code section 68 is another rate bubble that probably should be eliminated. This provision, which disallows a portion of itemized deductions to
certain high-income taxpayers, is one of the more difficult phase-outs to
categorize. If charitable contribution, home mortgage interest, and state
and local tax deductions are considered tax expenditures, as they are in the
United States Budget, Code section 68 may be viewed as limitation on tax
expenditures. But if these deductions are normatively proper, as is argued
by a number of commentators, section 68 performs a function similar to
that of Code section 151(d), has the same effect, and should be analyzed
in the same manner. The rationale for Code section 68 expressed in the
legislative history is phrased in terms of matching tax burdens with ability
to pay. 1°2 This indicates that Congress viewed the provision as a normative
tax rate increase, not as a limitation on tax expenditures. Sophisticated
analysts likewise have viewed Code section 68 as a proxy for a higher
maximum rate in section 1.103 This view is reinforced by the applicability
of Code section 68 to unreimbursed employee business expenses and section
212 expenses, which clearly are proper normative deductions. Thus, even
though it may be possible to use tax expenditure analysis to justify retention
of Code section 68, it should be analyzed as another disguised marginal
rate increase, not as a tax expenditure limitation. Since it too creates a
bubble maximum rate, it should be repealed.
All of the other phase-out rules should be critically examined with a
jaundiced eye. Where it is determined that it is undesirable not to phaseout the benefit and it is mechanically impossible to phase-out the allowance
101. See William J. Turnier & Douglas G. Kelly, The Economic Equivalence of Standard
Tax Credits, Deductions and Exemptions, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 1003 (1984).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2014, 2363.
103. See Gene Steuerle, Bubbles, Bangles, and Beads: Fixing Up the Top Rate, 59 TAX
Noms 425 (April 19, 1993).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:459

without creating marginal rate bubbles, the wisdom of the basic provision
itself should be re-examined.
III.

BASE BROADENING

Tax legislation of the 1980s, particularly the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
significantly expanded the tax base. Nevertheless, significant items of economic income for which no exclusion can be justified on any tax policy
criteria, including administrative convenience, and which also would be of
dubious validity under the most favorable analysis by a proponent of using
tax expenditures, still escape taxation. These items are special preferences
for particular investments or transactions that are difficult to justify using
any generally applicable objective criteria. Several changes in the tax base
would significantly enhance horizontal equity, make tax burdens more
closely correspond with true economic ability to pay, and increase tax
revenues to deal with the budget deficit and other priorities.
A.

Like Kind Exchanges

Code section 1031, which provides for nonrecognition of gain (and a
concomitant exchanged basis) on exchanges of like-kind property, should
be repealed. '4 Although section 1031, is subject to a mimber of exceptions,
including partnership interests and corporate stock, tax free like-kind exchanges are available for all business and investment tangible property.
Recently promulgated regulations restrict the ability to use Code section
1031 to defer gain on exchanges of personal property, but those regulations
are in reality of relatively little importance. The significance of section 1031
always has lain in its application to real estate.
In essence, the standard for determining if two real estate properties
are like kind as developed by the Service and the courts is "real estate is
real estate."'' 05 This rule belies any justification for Code section 1031 based
on the argument that the taxpayer has not liquidated the original investment.
When an oil well is exchanged for an apartment building, no reasonable
person honestly can contend that the first investment was not liquidated
and a new and different investment made. To tax a sale and immediate
reinvestment while exempting an exchange cannot be justified.
Even if the operation of Code section 1031 had been limited to contemporaneous exchanges with no other property involved, the provision could
not have been justified on the grounds of administrative convenienceavoiding the need to value the properties where the parties had not valued
them in dollars but simply had determined that they were of the same

104. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL.
L. REv. 397 (1987); Eric M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justificationfor Special Treatment of LikeKind Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 193 (1985).
105. See BoRms I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVriDUAs 27.2, at 27-6 (1988) ("As applied to real estate, [the Treasury's] interpretation
of 'likekind' is extraordinarily liberal"].
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undetermined value. The same could be said for any barter transaction,
and, except when Code section 1031 applies, barter transactions are all
taxable.
When Code section 1031 is put in context, any claim that it is an
administrative convenience evaporates, as does any claim that a sale and
reinvestment in like-kind property always is taxed. The combination of a
long line of cases dealing with "three-corner" and "four-comer" exchanges 6
and the Starker'°7 case, dealing with deferred exchanges with an interest
factor and a cash out option culminated in the enactment of Code section
1031(a)(3) and the promulgation of detailed Treasury Regulations 1°s providing both limitations and safe harbors for structuring both contemporaneous
and deferred multi-cornered like-kind exchanges. These regulations make it
clear that the form of the transaction controls completely; the substance is
irrelevant.
Suppose that A, who owns Blackacre, wishes to sell Blackacre to B and
to buy Whiteacre from C. If A sells Blackacre and buys Whiteacre, both
transactions are taxable. But the regulations permit A to accomplish the
same economic end-result in a nonrecognition event. To obtain like-kind
exchange treatment, A enters into a contract to sell Blackacre to B. A then
hires an intermediary to whom A will assign all of A's rights in the agreement
with B. Thus the intermediary is paid by B when A conveys Blackacre to
B. The intermediary enters into a contract with C for the purchase of
Whiteacre. Pursuant to the contract, C deeds Whiteacre directly to A and
is paid by the intermediary, who uses the funds from the sale of Blackacre.
Subject to numerous technical qualifying requirements, this transaction
is tax free to A. This result is nonsensical. There is no good reason that
investors should be able to move among various real estate investments
without paying taxes on realized gains when the same privilege is not
accorded to reinvestment of sales proceeds in a different investment. Because
adopting the latter rule-a "rollover" of capital gains operating akin to the
manner in which Code section 1034 operates with respect to a primary
residence-would substantially erode the concept of taxing economic income,
Code section 1031 should be repealed to enhance horizontal equity.
B.

Taxation of Gains at Death

Code section 1014 provides a fair market value at date of death basis
for property acquired from a decedent, but death is not a realization event
for including gains and losses in taxable income. The step-up in basis at
death effected by section 1014 thus forgives taxes permanently. This tax

106.
exchange
107.
108.

See, e.g., Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980) (holding four-party real estate
gualified under I.R.C. § 1031).
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-I (1991).
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expenditure is projected to result in a revenue loss of over $28 billion for
fiscal 1993.109 Allowing a tax free step-up in basis at death is inequitable.
From the horizontal equity perspective it discriminates against those who
sell property during their lifetimes and who recognize gains. The exclusion
of appreciation accrued as of the property owners date of death violates
vertical equity principles because it benefits primarily the wealthy. The rule
also has an economically undesirable "lock-in" effect that distorts the
allocation of capital between competing sources.1 0
Both equity and efficiency would be enhanced by treating death as a
realization event with respect to all property passing from a decedent to
anyone other than the decedent's spouse. A similar rule should be applied
to gifts. Concomitantly, Code section 1015 would be repealed and Code
section 1014 should be expanded to provide a fair market value at the date
of the gift basis for donees. Transfers to spouses should continue to be
nonrecognition events, and the spouse should receive a carryover basis, as
under Code section 1041, whether the transfer is by gift or upon death.
Charitable gifts should be subject to the general rules, which would permit
significant simplification in Code section 170, including the complete repeal
of section 170(e).
This is not a new or radical idea. Recognition of gains at death and
upon gift was proposed by President Kennedy in 1963,"' and by the Treasury
Department in 1969.112 The idea has been explored by commentators and is
theoretically sound." 3 Canada currently has a recognition of gains at death
rule. Given the illogic and significant revenue cost of the current rules, the
time for this change has come. Despite the fiasco with respect to the
retroactively repealed experiment with carryover basis at death under Cole
section 1023 in the late 1970s, the administrative difficulties of taxing gains
at death should not be significant. Claims that a successor in interest cannot
ascertain the decedent's basis for property are largely spurious. It can be
expected that those who claimed they could not ascertain the decedent's
basis for purposes of Code section 1023 would have little trouble determining
the decedent's basis if necessary to minimize the tax if death were a

109. BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIScAL YEaR
[hereinafter U.S. BUDGET].

1993, Part 11-39 (1992)

110. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 36-37 (1976).
111. See HearingsBefore the Comm. on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
on the Tax recommendations of the President Contained in His Message Transmitted to the

-

Congress, January 24, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 24 (1963).
112. HOUSE COMm. ON WAYS & MEANS & SENATE CoMMs. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST
Sass., TAX REFORM STUDES AND PROPOSALS, DEP'T TREASURY, part 1, 28-29 (Comm. Print
1969).
113. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The ConstitutionalMeaning of Income and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1992); Michael J. Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized
Gains at Death-An Evaluation of Current Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv. 830 (1973); Louis M.
Castruccio, Becoming More Inevitable? Death and Taxes... and Taxes, 17 UCLA L. REv.
459, 475-76 (1970) (attacking current tax treatment of capital gains at gift and death on
economic grounds).
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at death
realization event. The Canadian experience with taxing gains
114
problem.
significant
a
not
is
basis
establishing
that
indicates
Minimizing exceptions will eliminate much of the complexity that plagued
now repealed Code section 1023. There should be no special treatment of
any assets except as absolutely necessary for technical and administrative
reasons. Perhaps tangible personal property, other than collectibles, held
for personal use could be excepted with little revenue effect, but there
should be no exemption for small estates or any minimum basis provisions.
Apart from the factual inquiry necessary to determine basis, the most
significant administrative "complexity" caused by this proposal would be
the computations under an income averaging provision, which would be
necessary to mitigate the bunching of income in the year of death. Some
additional technical problems may arise in coordinating realization at death
with the estate tax, in particular coordinating the marital deduction in the
estate tax with the exception from realization at death for transfers to
spouses. These problems, however, are minor in comparison to the equity
and efficiency gains that would result from treating a transfer by death or
115
gift as a realization event.
C.

Taxing the Inside Build-up on Whole Life Insurance

As recommended by the Treasury Department in 1984,116 the inside
build-up of whole life insurance ought to be currently taxed. Current
taxation of the inside build-up on whole life insurance policies is completely
justifiable on grounds unrelated to the realization of gains at death. 1 17 Whole
life insurance, unlike term life insurance, has a significant financial investment component. The interest build-up is analogous to a savings account.
The interest earnings can be withdrawn at any time through a policy loan;
what purports to be interest on the policy loan is in reality an increased
premium charge on the increased amount of term insurance necessary to
pay the death benefit as a result of the withdrawal."'
The tax benefit of deferral, plus the potential benefit of exclusion
through Code section 101, is inefficient to the extent that it provides
insurance companies a competitive advantage over other financial institutions
in competing for investment dollars, as well as inequitable to the extent
that the tax benefits are not fully capitalized in lower interest rates. This
situation presents not only horizontal inequity, but also vertical inequity

114. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gainsat Death, 46 VAND. L. REv. 361, 391-92 (1993).
115. Id., passim.
116. 2 FAiRNEss, Sisiucrry, supra note 82, at 258-62.
117. See Andrew D. Pike, Reflections of the Meaning of Life: An Analysis of Section
7702 and the Taxation of Cash Value Insurance, 43 TAx L. REv. 491, 523-534 (1988) (providing
tax policy analysis of policyholder tax treatment and I.R.C. § 7702's limitations with respect
to interest credited under cash value life insurance).
118. I am indebted to Paul McDaniel for this insight.
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because the ownership of whole life insurance policies is relatively more
common as income increases.11 9
Even if the inside build-up of whole life insurance were currently taxed,
Code section 101(a) would prevent taxation to anyone of the mortality gain
portion of life insurance proceeds received upon death. From a tax policy
perspective there is no reason that these mortality gains should be excluded
from income. Life insurance proceeds, however, may be somewhat different
than unrealized appreciation in property held at death in that the fundamental purpose of most life insurance policies is to replace a long-term
income stream. Because of this purpose, some special long-term averaging
rules may be appropriate.
D. Limiting Tax-Free Fringe Benefits
Restricting the scope of tax free fringe benefits is high on almost every
list for tax reform. 120 In 1984, the Treasury proposed virtual wholesale
repeal of tax-free fringe benefit provisions; only medical plans were spared,
and they were to be limited.' 2' Under traditional tax policy criteria, tax-free
fringe benefits generally should be limited to those described as working
condition or de minimis fringe benefits in Code section 132 and for
administrability reasons, if for no other, nondiscriminatoryfree parking on
the employer's business premises. Allowing additional tax-free fringe benefits, designed to help solve some perceived "problem," can be justified only
on the basis of tax expenditure analysis. As such, the burden of proof for
justifying using the Tax Code rather than direct spending should be high.'2
The "qualified transportation fringe benefit" rules12 recently enacted
as part of the Energy Policy Act of 19 9 212A are an example of a tax-free
fringe benefit of the type that should be very critically examined. Under
new section 132(f), employer-provided transit passes, "commuter highway
vehicle" use and "qualified parking" are tax-free fringe benefits. A "commuter highway vehicle" is defined in section 132(0(5)(B) as a vehicle that
seats six adults in addition to the driver and at least eighty percent of its
total use is for transporting employees between their homes and workplace,
on trips on which at least half of the passengers seats (excluding the driver)
are filled by commuting employees. "Qualified parking" includes not only
parking at or near the employer's place of business but also parking at a
remote location from which the employee commutes by way of a "commuter
highway vehicle," carpool, or mass transit qualifying for the transit pass

119. 2 FAIRNESS, Smwicrry, supra note 82, at 262.
120. See, e.g., Karla W. Simon, Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform HistoricalBlunders and
a Proposalfor Structural Change, 36 FLA. L. REv. 871 (1984).
121. 2 FAIRNEss, SnPLicrrY, supra note 82, at 20-50.
122. See STANLEY S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 147-54 (1973) [hereinafter
PATHWAYS] (arguing that much is lost by using tax incentive rather than direct expenditure).
123. I.R.C. § 132(f) (Supp. 1993).
124. Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1911(b), 26 U.S.C. § 132(0 (Supp. 1993).
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exclusion. 25 The exclusion is limited to $155 per month for qualified parking
and $60 per month in the aggregate for transit passes and qualified highway
vehicle use, subject to adjustment for inflation. 126 According to the legislative
history, the purpose of this exclusion is to "create a meaningful incentive
for employers to support commuting by public transit" which "could
provide substantial benefits to society, such as reduced traffic congestion
and reduced environmental degradation."' 2 7
Other already existing, similar tax-free fringe benefits include qualified
group legal services plans,'2 educational assistance programs, 29 and dependent care assistance programs. 30 All of these programs have social goals
that may be justifiable. Furthermore, the tax expenditure subsidy resulting
from providing tax-free treatment for some of these fringe benefits very
well may have the intended effect of increasing the availability or use of
the tax-free benefit. Nevertheless, some skepticism regarding whether the
benefits outweigh the costs of achieving these goals through the tax system
is warranted.
Tax planning may be important, but it is difficult to believe, for
example, that many individuals who otherwise would commute in their own
car will accept lesser cash compensation in exchange for tax-free public
transit passes as allowed by section 132(f). If that is true, the intended
effects will not materialize and the tax benefits of this provision would
inure largely to employees who already commute by mass transit. In that
case the provision would serve no purpose. Not only would it unnecessarily
lose revenue, but it also would be statutory clutter, increasing complexity.
Even if the qualified transportation fringe benefit provision has the
intended effect, the public perceptions that arise from achieving this goal
through a tax expenditure must be considered. Many people do not have a
realistic option to commute by mass transit. Many employees will find their
employers simply unwilling to provide "commuter highway vehicles" for
use by their employees because administrative transaction costs are too high.
These individuals will continue to be required to pay for commuting with
after tax dollars while other luckier taxpayers are able to transmute nondeductible costs to a tax-free fringe benefit. This sort of distinction is the
type of rule that breeds disrespect for the tax system among the public.
When a special preference is made available to limited numbers of taxpayers,
whose ability to take advantage of the preference is determined largely by
luck, other less favored taxpayers become more likely to try to make their
own "luck," and enforcement problems multiply. Similar issues arise with
respect to the other statutory tax-free fringe benefits.

125. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(C).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

I.R.C. § 132(0(2).
H.R. REP. No. 474,
I.R.C. § 120 (Supp.
I.R.C. § 127 (Supp.
I.R.C. § 129 (Supp.

part VI, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1992).
1993).
1993).
1993).
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Congress should reconsider carefully the various tax-free fringe benefit
provisions. A few are difficult, if not impossible, to justify even as tax
32
expenditures. No additional cost services,' 3 ' qualified employee discounts,
and qualified tuition reductions, 33 are discriminatory, favoring employees
in particular industries, and serve no readily apparent well defined national
policy. These provisions are inequitable and add complexity. They should
be repealed.
Rather than continue to enact more tax-free fringe benefits, such as
qualified transportation fringe benefits, Congress should systematically reconsider the remaining tax expenditure based fringe benefit provisions and
weed out those that do not actually further an important national policy in
the best possible manner. Those fringe benefits subject to sunset provisions,
such as qualified group legal services plans and educational assistance plans
should be allowed to expire unless their efficacy can be well established.
Code sections 105, excluding accident and health benefits, and 106,
excluding accident and health coverage, should be reconsidered in the context
of the nascent current examination of national health care policy. In any
event, however, the current system under which some individuals are able
to purchase medical insurance with before-tax dollars while other individuals
must pay with after-tax dollars should not be perpetuated. If national health
reform stalls, either Code sections 105 and 106 stiould be repealed or, if
the tax expenditure justification for these provisions is considered to outweigh the tax policy considerations for their repeal, a universal deduction
for medical insurance premiums should be enacted.
The remaining statutory fringe benefits should be scaled back if Congress
can devise better methods for achieving the intended results. In evaluating
the desirability of these provisions Congress should not minimize the problems of limited availability and the public perceptions of unfairness that
arise when tax-free fringe benefits in fact are made available by only a
limited number of employers. Although policy analysts may understand the
difference between normative tax rules and tax expenditures, the public
generally does not. The public views all tax rules through the same lens.
Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, the goal should be to leave
working condition fringes, including nondiscriminatory on-site parking, and
de minimis items as the only tax-free fringe benefits to the extent administratively feasible.
ProhibitDeductions for Business Meals and Entertainment
President Clinton's 1993 Revenue Proposals would reduce the deductible
portion of business meals and entertainment from 80% to 50% and disallow

131. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1).
132. I.R.C. § 132(a)(2).
133. I.R.C. § 117(d) (Supp. 1993).
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entirely deductions for club dues. 134 The stated rationale for disallowing
these expenses is that it is inappropriate to allow a deduction for expenses
that are inherently personal. This rationale makes sense, of course, when
the payor is being entertained or consuming the meal. Current law permits
a privileged class of taxpayers-generally very high income taxpayers-to
pay for a large portion of their personal entertainment with before-tax
dollars simply by adding some business trappings to the event. 135 But there
is no reason to limit to 50% of the expenditure the amount that is deemed
to be inherently personal. Deductions for meals and entertainment should
be disallowed entirely, with the possible exception of meals provided to
employees as a tax-free fringe benefit under section 132. To the extent that
the payor receives the meals or entertainment, the entire expense ought to
be nondeductible. Any attempt to divine the portion of the expense that
exceeds the value of the personal consumption enjoyed would be futile.
As far as meals and entertainment provided to others, such as customers
or clients or employees of a corporation that reimburses expenses, the
personal benefit rationale does not apply. Nevertheless, no deduction should
be allowed unless the value of the entertainment is taxed to the recipient. 36
Theoretically, the meals and entertainment provided to others should be
deductible and the person enjoying the meal or entertainment ought include
the value in income. Because this treatment is not administrable, simply
137
disallowing a deduction will serve as a proxy.
Eliminating the deduction for meals and entertainment also will have
salutary economic effects. The current deduction is a significant subsidy to
the restaurant and entertainment industries. The market prices for meals
and entertainment are driven up by the tax-induced increased demand. Thus,
while some taxpayers benefit from the deductibility of meals and entertainment, under the current rules most taxpayers are forced to pay higher prices
38
with after-tax dollars.
F. FurtherRestricting Home Mortgage Interest Deductions
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, interest was virtually universally
deductible. One of the significant base broadening aspects of the 1986 Act
was elimination of the deduction for consumer interest other than limited
home mortgage interest. Since 1987, generally speaking, section 163(h) has
allowed a deduction for interest on mortgages of up to $1,000,000, the
proceeds of which are used to purchase or improve the taxpayer's principal

134. ADMiN STRATioN'S PRoPOsALS, supra note 6, at 38-39.
135. 2 FAiRNmSS, SIMPIcrrY, supra note 82, at 81-83.
136. See TRPAs. DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM: DETAILED DEsCRIPTIONS
AND SUPPORTING ANALYsis OF THE PROPOSALS 182 (1978).
137. See Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for PersonalLiving Expenses: A Uniform
Approach to An Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PENN. L. Rav. 859 (1974) (arguing for elimination
of deduction for excess of personal satisfaction over cost of personal items).
138. 2 FANmSS, SIMPLIcrry, supra note 82, at 84-85.
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residence and one other residence. In addition, interest on "home equity
mortgage indebtedness" of up to $100,000 also is deductible.' 39
The home mortgage interest deduction long has been a target of tax
reformers." 4' It is attacked as inequitably favoring homeowners over renters,
the wealthy over the poor. It has nothing at all to do with measuring net
income. Because the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing is
excluded from gross income, the home mortgage interest deduction is a tax
expenditure to subsidize housing.' 4' As a housing subsidy it provides benefits
that bear a direct relationship to income. The blue collar worker who earns
$25,000 a year and pays home mortgage interest of $3,000 on a loan to
purchase a $50,000 house receives a subsidy of $450 (assuming that the
worker itemizes deductions). As income increases, the amount of the benefit
increases. The corporate executive with a $1 million salary, who pays $60,000
interest on a loan to purchase a $1 million dollar house receives a subsidy
No direct subsidy for housing
of $18,600 (ignoring Code sections 67 and 68).
42
ever would be structured in that manner.
Notwithstanding its theoretical weakness and inequitable economics, the
home mortgage interest deduction is as American as apple pie. Neither of
the two major Treasury Department studies of tax reform proposals published in the last quarter-century have proposed its repeal, despite the strong
base-broadening tenor of both of those studies. 43 But the current deduction
goes far beyond what is necessary to fulfill the publicly stated goal of the
defenders of the home mortgage interest deduction-to make the American
dream of home ownership available to the average American. 144 Code section
163(h)(3) allows a deduction for interest on home mortgage 'of up to
$1,000,000. This amount is far in excess of the median price of housing in
the United States, or in an any particular region or standard metropolitan
statistical area. 45 In 1990, the median sales price of new homes was slightly
below $125,000 and the median sales price of existing homes under $100,000.'4
Even in the Northeast, the most expensive region, median prices of both
new and existing homes were less than $160,000.47 Only California and
Hawaii had any standard metropolitan statistical4 areas with a median sales
price for homes in excess of $200,000 in 1990.'1

139. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1993).

140. See, e.g., William F. Hellmuth, Homeowner Preferences, in
163 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977).

CoMPREHENsrVE INcomE

TAXATION,

141. U.S. BUDGET, supra note 109, at Part 11-32.

142. See

PATHWAYS,

supra note 122, at 232-36.

143. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 100, at 88-89; 1 FAINuEsS, SnenLcrry, supra note 82, at 39.
144. That the home mortgage interest deduction actually lowers the cost of housing is a
proposition of questionable economic theory. To a large extent the tax benefit may be
capitalized into the cost of purchasing homes.
145. COMMERCE DEP'T, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 714, 722-23 (1991).
146. Id.at 714.
147. Id. at 722.
148. Id. at 723.
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Subsidizing opulent home ownership through the tax system is unnecessary and inequitable. Even if we accept the rationale espoused by supporters of the home mortgage interest deduction and continue it in some
form, the availability of the deduction should be much more severely
curtailed. There is no good reason whatsoever for allowing a deduction for
interest to purchase a home that costs many times the median home price.
Drawing a precise line may be difficult, particularly because the median
price of housing differs throughout the country. If the cost of housing were
uniform, it might make sense to limit the deduction to interest on a purchase
money mortgage in an amount equal to the median price of housing in the
year the residence was purchased. Because it is unlikely for political reasons
that the deduction could be so limited, perhaps a ceiling of double the
median cost of housing would be an acceptable compromise. Some consideration also should be given to the need for special ceilings for standard
metropolitan statistical areas with extraordinarily high median housing prices.
In any event, allowing a deduction for interest on mortgages on second
homes should be repealed entirely. Second homes are virtually always a
luxury. There is absolutely no reason for subsidizing the ownership of
vacation homes. The deduction is both inequitable and economically inefficient. This is even more readily apparent when one considers that a large
pleasure boat with a galley, berths, and a head qualifies as a second home
for purposes of deducting home mortgage interest. Even viewed as a tax
expenditure, the current rules reflect an implausible policy decision when
one considers that interest on a loan to buy a pleasure yacht may be
deducted, while interest on a loan to pay education expenses is nondeductible, unless the education expenses are deductible, other than as an employee
49
business expenses, under the Treasury Regulations.'
. Deductibility of interest on home equity loans likewise should be repealed. The legislative history of the provisions allowing a deduction for
interest on home equity indebtedness provides no coherent explanation of
the policy reasons underlying Congress's decision to allow the deduction.' 50
Indeed, when the allowance of a deduction for home mortgage indebtedness
is compared with the disallowance of personal interest, it is readily apparent
that there cannot be any rational policy reason for the deduction. Even
more so than the general tracing rules of section 1.163-8T of the Treasury
Regulations, the home equity mortgage interest deduction can be said to
limit the impact of the disallowance of deductions for personal interest to
the level of a tax on "the stupid and the poor."
Apartment dwellers and homeowners with little or no equity are denied
any deduction for loans to finance their own or their child's education or
to purchase an automobile or other consumer durable. Homeowners, how-

149. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967) (discussing deduction for education
expenses).
150. See H.R. RP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1031-34 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-647 to 2313-650.
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ever, subject to the $100,000 debt ceiling can obtain a deduction for interest
to finance any of these purchases, or even a Caribbean vacation, simply by
giving the lender a mortgage on their residence. This result is manifestly
unfair from the perspective of horizontal equity, and when one considers
that both home ownership and the net equity in homes increases as income
and wealth increase, it also presents vertical inequities. When one considers
that the median price of housing is under $125,000, purchase money
mortgages generally originate at approximately eighty percent of purchase
price, and home equity lenders generally limit the combined debt of the
first mortgages and home equity loan to 90% of value, it becomes readily
apparent that the provision allowing deductibility of interest on home equity
loans of up to $100,000 is an allowance disproportionately benefitting the
wealthy.
Even viewed as a tax expenditure, the allowance of a deduction for
interest on home equity indebtedness makes no sehse. It encourages mortgaging homes to satisfy demand for consumption. In other words, because
most consumption expenditures and consumer durables lose value more
rapidly than residential real estate, it encourages homeowners to decrease
their net worth and increase the risk of foreclosure on their residences.
Whatever benefits the deductibility of interest on home equity indebtedness
arguably may produce surely cannot outweigh these costs.
IV.

DEDUCTIBMITY OF PROFIT-SEEKING EXPENSES

Only real expenses of producing income should be deductible, but all
real expenses of producing income should be deductible. Neither of these
propositions is true under current law. Despite the base broadening in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Internal Revenue Code continues to be riddled
with tax expenditure investment incentives. -Although these incentives may
be well intentioned, ultimately their costs outweigh their benefits.' 51 These
have lead to enormous complexity, including the passive activity loss rules
of Code section 469 and the alternative minimum tax. It was these tax
incentives that were the backbone of the flourishing tax shelter industry of
the 1970s and 1980s, which high income taxpayers used to reduce their tax
burdens. As long as these incentives, such as accelerated depreciation under
section 168, remain in the Code, unnecessary complexity is inevitable.
A. Passive Activity Loss Rules
The passive activity loss disallowance rules of Code section 469 have
been lauded for their salutary effect of closing down the tax shelter industry.' 5 2 But the price has been fearful statutory complexity and in some
151. See Charles R. Hulten & Robert A. Klayman, Investment Incentives in Theory and
Practice, in UNEASY CoMPRomsE, supra note 37, at 317, 335-36 (concluding that investment
incentives incur more cost than benefit).
152. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Legislation?A Response
to Professor Zelenak, 67 TEx. L. Rav. 591 (1989) (arguing that passive activity rules have
been successful at screening out artificial losses that arise under normal tax rules).
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circumstances mismeasurement of economic income. 5 ' Whether the passive
activity loss rules should be continued is an important issue that should be
studied. As a result of Code section 469, it is fair to say that the income
tax system has begun to resemble a schedular system rather than a global
system. To be sure, section 469 is not the only culprit. Investment income
and expenses long have been subject to special treatment. Capital loss
limitations and preferential rates for capital gains entail some features of
schedularization, as does the investment interest limitation in Code section
163(d). But the passive activity loss limitations magnify the problems greatly.
Nevertheless, the passive activity loss rules should not be condemned
without weighing in their favor a different type of simplicity that they have
fostered. As a result of the enactment of section 469, and certain other
changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax shelter industry virtually
has been shut down. Large numbers of inordinately complex, mostly nonproductive transactions that previously occurred and absorbed the time and
energy of investors, lawyers, accountants, and government officials, as well
as significant amounts of capital, have been eliminated. Furthermore, the
passive activity loss rules affect a limited number of taxpayers. Although
in theory section 469 may apply to a passive sole proprietor, in fact almost
the entire impact is reflected in reporting of items from partnerships and
real estate.54 In 1988, approximately nine million returns reported income
or loss from rental activities, and nearly six million returns reported income
or loss from partnerships and S corporations. 5 Thus, approximately fifteen
million (not allowing for any overlap) out of nearly one hundred and ten
million taxpayers possibly had to consider the applicability of Code section
469.
The complexity argument alone may not be sufficient to justify repeal
of section 469. Involvement in tax shelter investments is a voluntary assumption of complexity. However, in addition to disallowing the artificial
losses that drove tax shelters, section 469 also structurally disallows actual
economic losses incurred by "passive" business owners . 56 This effect goes
beyond the stated reason for enacting the passive activity loss rules: "in
order for tax preferences to function as intended, their benefit must be
directed primarily to taxpayers with substantial and bona fide involvement
in the activities to which the preferences relate."' 57 This stated rationale for
section 469 makes little economic sense, however, if the benefit of tax

153. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules,
62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1988) ; Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical
Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 Tax. L. Rav.
499 (1989).
154. S01-1988, supra note 47, at 5.
155. Id. at 29, 31.
156. Compare the Limitation on Artificial Loss (LAL) proposal of the Treasury in 1973,
which would have deferred only losses attributable to accelerated cost recovery tax expenditures.
TREAs. DEP'T, PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE 94-104 (1973).
157. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 716 (1986).
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preferences is capitalized into the price of the preferred assets, as is widely
believed.' On the other hand, the market may have failed to capitalize the
benefit in many tax shelter transactions, particularly those involving seller
nonrecourse financing."19 In that case, Congress's decisions regarding the
beneficiaries of its largesse is more of a political question that one of logical
reasoning.
Accepting Congress's stated reason for adopting the passive activity loss
rules, it still is fair to conclude that it painted with too broad a brush.
Most tax shelters depended on the convergence of two factors, accelerated
cost recovery and nonrecourse financing. If either of those legs is knocked
out, the tax shelter collapses. Although Congress was unwilling in 1986 to
eliminate accelerated depreciation and expensing of certain capital outlays,
it did eliminate the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation of
real estate, extending the cost recovery period of real estate as well. Congress
also strengthened Code section 465, limiting deductions attributable to
nonrecourse debt, but continued to permit third-party nonrecourse debt to
support deductions for real estate. In all likelihood, these changes would
have significantly reduced the number of new shelters even without the
enactment of section 469.
On balance, the tax system would benefit from the repeal of Code
section 469 and its replacement with a stronger attack on the two factors
that made tax shelters possible in the first place. Accelerated cost recovery
deductions should be limited even more than under current law, and
Congress should resist the temptation to "fix" the economy by enacting an
investment tax credit. Rather, greater effort should be made to level the
playing field toward economic depreciation for all assets. Under an income
tax, only economic depreciation avoids distortions in investment choices. 160
Section 465 limitations on deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt
should be strengthened. The current exception for qualified nonrecourse
financing in Code section 465(b)(6) should be repealed. Section 465 should
be revised to apply to all nonrecourse debt, with absolutely no exceptions.' 16
Current rules deeming indebtedness to certain related parties to be nonrecourse should be retained. Coupled with the rules for allocating partnership
debt under the section 752 Regulations, these changes reasonably can be
expected to have sufficient prophylactic effect to permit repeal of Code
section 469. This would treat the problem, not mask its symptoms.

158. See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalizationor Does the Early Bird Get
a Free Lunch, 28 NAT 'L TAX J. 416 (1975).
159. George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and ControllingIncome Tax
Avoidance, 85 CoLuM. L. Rsv. 657, 701, 710-14 (1985).
160. See, e.g., Paul R. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure
Invariant Valuations, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 604, 606 (1964) (stating only putative decline in
economic value provides sensible definition for measuring "true money income").
161. For a thorough discussion of the reasons for limiting depreciation on all debt
financed basis, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reforming Cost Recovery Allowances for Debt
Financed Depreciable Property, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1029 (1985).
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B.

Disfavored Profit-Seeking Expenses

Currently, the Tax Code categorically denies full deductibility to certain
types of profit seeking expenses. Unreimbursed employee business expenses,
investment income expenses (Code section 212 expenses), and investment
interest long have been deductible only as itemized deductions under section
63, rather than in computing adjusted gross income. 62 Thus, because the
standard deduction does double duty as a low income allowance and an
administratively convenient proxy for itemized deductions, nonitemizers who
incur unreimbursed employee business expenses and investment expenses
effectively are taxed on gross income rather than net income. The legislative
history of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, which introduced the
adjusted gross income concept and standard deduction, acknowledges the
different treatment of employee business expenses but does not give any
63
reason for the discrimination.'
Since 1986, deductions for unreimbursed employee business expenses
and investment expenses other than interest have been even more restricted.
These expenses are treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions under Code
section 67. As such, they are deductible only to the extent that the total
exceeds two percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Thus, for
example, a taxpayer with a salary of $50,000 who itemizes deductions and
has no deductions taken into account in computing adjusted gross income
may not deduct the first $1,000 of unreimbursed employee business expenses.
The stated reasons for subjecting employee business expenses and investment expenses to these limitations are of dubious validity. According to
the General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the restrictions
were enacted because "the prior-law treatment of employee business expenses, investment expenses, and other miscellaneous itemized deductions
fostered significant complexity, and ... some of these expenses have
characteristics of voluntary personal expenditures."'" Specifically, Congress
believed that the record keeping burden was excessive relative to the amount
of the expenditures, and the deductibility of these items presented significant
administrative and enforcement problems, particularly because taxpayers
frequently made mistakes with respect to such deductions. The cited errors
included disregarding the restrictions on home office deductions and deductibility of education expenses, deducting costs of a safe deposit box used
only to store personal belongings, and deducting the cost of subscriptions
without a sufficient business or investment purpose. Congress nevertheless
concluded that taxpayers with unusually large employee business or investment expenses should be allowed some deduction, analogizing large amounts

162. Deductions for investment interest also are limited by section 163(d), but that
provision defers rather than disallows deductions.
163. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1944), reprintedin 1944 C.B. 821,
838-40; S. Rep. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1944 C.B. 858, 877-80.
164. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.ON TAXATION, GENRAL EXPLANATION OF Tm TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986 78 (1987).
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of such expenses to medical expenses and casualty losses, which Congress
concluded should be deductible only if they significantly affect the individual's disposable income. Finally, Congress also justified the floor on the
grounds that it "takes into account that some miscellaneous expenses are
sufficiently personal in nature that they would be incurred apart from any
business or investment activities of the taxpayer," citing professional association dues, subscriptions to publications, and safe deposit box rentals. 65
While it may be true that allowing deductions for employee business
expenses creates an administrative burden, both of record-keeping for taxpayers and auditing by the IRS, and that some unreimbursed employee
business expenses and investment expenses have a personal as well as profit
seeking motive, these problems are overstated by the legislative history.
They are no different than issues arising with respect to self-employed
individuals. Code section 67's 2% floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions is an inappropriate response to the purported problems for numerous
reasons. The purported taxpayer record keeping burden is minimal. Checking
account records, credit card records, and a logbook for travel expenses
provide all of the necessary information for all but truly trivial items. If
administrative convenience really is an issue, some consideration should be
given to a standard allowance equal to a fixed percentage of earnings from
wages or self-employment in lieu of claiming actual expenses. Such a system
is employed in some other countries, including Canada and France.'"
If the problem is abusive deductions for mixed purpose expenditures,
Congress clearly is barking up the wrong tree. Sole proprietors, partners in
small partnerships, and corporations controlled by owner-employees are far
more likely to deduct personal expenses under the guise of business expenses
than are employees.' 67
Finally, from the perspective of accurately measuring income, Code
section 67 creates a completely arbitrary and unjustified distinction between
employees and the self-employed. 68 For example, a sole practitioner or
partner in a law firm may deduct American Bar Association dues without
question, but an associate in a law firm or a government lawyer in all
likelihood will be denied any effective deduction. Section 67 does not apply
only to "voluntary" expenses. Its sweep extends to expenses that are
"necessary" in a relatively narrow sense of the term: union dues paid by
an employee in a closed shop, continuing education expenses necessary to

165. Id. at 79.

166. COMPARAiWE TAX SYSTEMS, EUROPE, CANADA, AND JAPAN 155, 344 (Joseph A.
Pechman ed., 1987).
167. See HousE WAYS AND MEAs Comm., OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 22227 (1991); Dan Subotnik, Equity for the Compliers: On Eliminating-orExtending-the Two
Percent Rule, 56 TAX NOTES 809 (Aug. 10, 1992).
168. See 3 REPORT OF TiE ROYAL COZYBUSSION ON TAXATION (Canada) 289-90 (Canada
1966) (recommending repeal of "unfair discrimination against employees" with respect to
deductions for business expenses under Canadian tax system).
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maintain a professional license or certification, annual registration fees to
maintain a professional license, noncommuting transportation between jobsites. Even where the expenses are voluntary, it is manifestly unjust to apply
different standards to employees than to self-employed taxpayers.
Code section 67 also creates a distinction in practice between owneremployees of closely held corporations and all non-owner employees. Owners
of closely held corporations can and do provide themselves with full
reimbursement or direct payment by the corporation, as excludable working
condition fringe benefits. These include not just legitimate business expenses,
but many mixed purpose expenses, as well as clearly personal expenses.
They avoid even raising the issue of deductibility on their own tax returns.
Code section 67 cannot be justified on the grounds that nearly all
taxpayers have some such unreimbursed employee business expenses or Code
section 212 expenses and that only excessive expenses affect the individual's
ability to pay taxes. Under this logic, it would make sense to limit the
deduction of business expenses of partnerships and corporations to the
amount by which expenses exceeded 2% of gross income. No one seriously
would suggest such a rule.
Unreirnbursed employee business expenses and investment expenses should
be fully deductible. If Code section 67 is repealed and the standard deduction
is eliminated, as I have suggested, nothing more need be done. If the
standard deduction is retained as an administrative convenience it should
be in lieu only of tax expenditure personal deductions. Employee business
expenses and investment expenses should be deductible in computing adjusted gross income. 69
V.

CONCLUSION

That is my personal list of high priority items for the agenda of
reforming personal income taxation within the context of the present system.
There is much that I have not discussed because of lack of space and,
sometimes, insufficient knowledge. The single most important issue that I
have avoided entirely is how to deal with the regressivity of Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) taxes which are imposed only on wages below a
ceiling. This tax issue cannot reasonably be analyzed without a thorough
examination of the social security benefits distribution system as well. If,
however, the criteria of relative importance of subjects for reform are the
revenues involved and the number of taxpayers affected, the equitable and
economic impact of the FICA tax may alone be more important than all
of the items I have discussed. For similar reasons, I have not discussed
qualified pension plans. To do so requires a very thorough analysis of
income security issues generally.
I have not discussed deductions for medical expenses, charitable contributions, personal casualty losses, and state taxes, because I still vacillate

169. Treating these expenses as deductions in computing adjusted gross income also would
negate the effect of section 68 on such deductions.
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on whether to some extent these items are proper deductions in determining
income or are properly classified as tax expenditures, although, at least for
today, I lean toward the-latter view. Taxation of financial instruments has
been slighted because for all the wonderful complexity of the original issue
discount regulations, in the grand scheme of things taxation of financial
instruments is a relatively minor issue in individual income taxation. I could
go on justifying the items selected or explaining the items not selected, but
the rationalizations are of little consequence.
Two general themes run through the proposals discussed in this essay.
One is a renewed commitment to progressive taxation to mitigate the growing
disparity in incomes and wealth in this country. The other is further refining
the tax base to include items that currently are excluded without adequate
justification and to allow deductions for all costs of earning an income.
Finally, I close with the universal plea for simplification. To a large
extent this is consistent with the general theme of eliminating unjustifiable
exclusions and selective investment incentives. If investment incentives,
particularly accelerated cost recovery allowances, are eliminated, then the
passive activity loss rules and alternative minimum tax, both of which add
significant complexity, also could be eliminated. 170 Avoiding the reintroduction of a significant preference for capital gains is another major element
of simplification. Special rules and exceptions should be eschewed. Generally
speaking, the more nearly taxable income approaches economic income, the
simpler the tax system will be. Accordingly, I propose that Congress should
abandon its view of the Internal Revenue Code as a means to provide
incentives and disincentives, provide taxpayers with a simpler system to
voluntarily comply with and let economic growth fend for itself.

170. The alternative minimum tax adds complexities that often are overlooked by policy
makers and analysts. For example, because the dependent care credit under Code section 21
is not allowed against alternative minimum tax liability, see I.R.C. § 26, many individuals
who never actually have any minimum tax liability nevertheless are directed to, and must,
complete Form 6251, calculating minimum tax liability, as part of calculating their child care
credit. See INTERNAL R vm~uE SERVICE, INSTRUCTIONS TO FoRM 2441 (1992).

